asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS58469 MOCI-AS-AP Ministry of Communication & IT

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AF
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology

Afghanistan · AI-generated

government telecom afghanistan

MOCI-AS-AP is operated by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of Afghanistan.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries government telecommunications infrastructure, identified by the netname MOCI-AF and registrant Ministry of Communication & IT.
  • The AS announces 512 IPv4 addresses across 1 prefix (103.132.98.0/23) and maintains 3 observed neighbours, indicating a small-scale government network with limited peering.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of state-run communication services and administrative endpoints managed by the Afghan government's ICT ministry.

Notable

  • Registrants align with the announcer, listing Ministry of Communication IT administrator and Ministry of Communication & IT for the sole prefix.
  • The address inventory consists of a single /23 block, representing a compact and self-contained government allocation.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
National Internet Exchange of AfghanistanKabul, Afghanistan103.104.146.50

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS138322Afghan Wireless Communication Company63

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
AFAfghanistan1

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS58469
Registry name
MOCI-AS-AP
Registrant
Ministry of Communication & IT
Abuse contact
jamalmojtaba.021@gmail.com
Registered
2019-04-18
Last changed
2020-07-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS58469
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS58469

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check