asn.dev

Routing security

AS58289 KAZNETCOM

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 15 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS58289 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:6600::/48RPKI validIRR32
78.109.19.0/24RPKI validIRR55
82.115.58.0/24RPKI validIRR55
82.115.59.0/24RPKI validIRR54
85.159.94.0/24RPKI validIRR55
86.54.184.0/24RPKI validIRR55
91.147.108.0/24RPKI validIRR55
91.147.111.0/24RPKI validIRR55
92.240.243.0/24RPKI validIRR54
109.175.215.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.162.234.0/24RPKI validIRR55
193.43.251.0/24RPKI validIRR55
194.31.133.0/24RPKI validIRR55
194.31.135.0/24RPKI validIRR55
212.108.87.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS58289 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
78.109.19.0/24/24RIPENCC
82.115.58.0/24/24RIPENCC
82.115.59.0/24/24RIPENCC
85.159.94.0/24/24RIPENCC
86.54.184.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.147.108.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.147.111.0/24/24RIPENCC
92.240.243.0/24/24RIPENCC
109.175.215.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.162.234.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.43.251.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.31.133.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.31.135.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.108.87.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0e:6600::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS58289 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
78.109.19.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2025-11-02Announced
82.115.58.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2026-05-20Announced
82.115.59.0/24RIPE—MNT-KZ-ANNA-12026-09-11Announced
85.159.94.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2025-09-15Announced
86.54.184.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2025-02-12Announced
91.147.108.0/24RIPE—MNT-KZ-ANNA-12026-04-29Announced
91.147.111.0/24RIPE—MNT-KZ-ANNA-12024-02-13Announced
92.240.243.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2024-09-30Announced
109.175.215.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2025-06-27Announced
185.162.234.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2023-02-08Announced
193.43.251.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2023-02-08Announced
194.31.133.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2023-09-19Announced
194.31.135.0/24RIPE—MNT-KZ-ANNA-12023-12-04Announced
212.108.87.0/24RIPE—KAZNETCOM-MNT2024-12-19Announced
2a0e:6600::/48RIPE—MNT-KZ-ANNA-12024-03-05Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS58289 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-KAZANRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-KAZTELECOMPEERSRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-SET-GTI-INDONESIAAPNICLists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-SET-GTI-PIP-CUSTOMERS-CUSTOMERAPNICLists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-SET-GTI-PIP-CUSTOMERS-CUSTOMERRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-SET_TNSPLUSRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-SMARTNET-PEERSRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS58289:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS58289 as a direct member
AS63529:AS-63529-AS-IMPORT-AS23764APNICLists AS58289 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.