asn.dev

Routing security

AS56837 TIGRON-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS56837 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:6ec0:100::/40RPKI validIRR35
2a00:6ec0:300::/40RPKI validIRR35
2a00:6ec0:400::/40RPKI validIRR35
31.22.16.0/24RPKI validIRR54
31.22.20.0/22RPKI validIRR54
86.39.64.0/20RPKI validIRR54
2001:67c:1808::/48RPKI validIRR35

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS56837 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
31.22.16.0/24/24RIPENCC
31.22.20.0/22/22RIPENCC
86.39.64.0/20/20RIPENCC
2001:67c:1808::/48/48RIPENCC
2a00:6ec0:100::/40/40RIPENCC
2a00:6ec0:300::/40/40RIPENCC
2a00:6ec0:400::/40/40RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS56837 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a00:6ec0:200::/40RIPETigron at bru-ix.beTGRN-MNT2014-04-16Not announced
31.22.16.0/24RIPETigron - bru-hq.beTGRN-MNT2018-03-27Announced
31.22.20.0/22RIPETigron - bru-hdc.beTGRN-MNT2018-03-27Announced
86.39.64.0/20RIPETigron - bru-lcl.beTGRN-MNT2018-03-27Announced
2001:67c:1808::/48RIPEFOSDEM infrastructure at TigronFOSDEM-MNT2014-01-08Announced
2a00:6ec0:100::/40RIPETigron at bru-lcl.beTGRN-MNT2014-04-16Announced
2a00:6ec0:300::/40RIPETigron at bru-hdc.beTGRN-MNT2014-04-16Announced
2a00:6ec0:400::/40RIPETigron at bru-hq.beTGRN-MNT2014-04-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS56837 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-EVONETRIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUSTRIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUST6RIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-JARMTELCOALTDBLists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-KPNRIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS-TIGRONRIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS6774:AS-BICS-CUST:AS56837RIPELists AS56837 as a direct member
AS8220:AS-COLTBERIPELists AS56837 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.