asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS56588 EE-CERT EE CERT

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 2.05K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly EE
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CERT-EE

Estonia · AI-generated

government security infrastructure

EE-CERT is operated by the Information System Authority (RIA), Estonia's national computer emergency response team.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries security incident response infrastructure, evidenced by the netname EE-CERT-20110124 and reverse DNS entries like 254-141.rev.cert.ee.
  • The AS announces 2048 IPv4 addresses and 1 IPv6 prefix, with only 1 observed neighbour, indicating a small, isolated network dedicated to specific operational functions rather than general transit or mass access.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of security monitoring, incident coordination, and critical infrastructure support services provided by the Estonian state authority.

Notable

  • Registrants align with the announcer, listing CERT NOC; Information System Authority; Abuse Contact for the primary prefix.
  • The address inventory is compact, consisting of a single /21 IPv4 block and a /32 IPv6 prefix, consistent with a specialized government agency rather than a commercial ISP.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Tallinn Governmental Internet ExchangeTallinn, Estonia213.184.52.66

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8240Information System Authority90

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
EEEstonia2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS56588
Registry name
EE-CERT
Registrant
AS56588-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@cert.ee
Registered
2011-04-06
Last changed
2024-12-13
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS56588
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
10 naming AS56588

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check