asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS56497 MORS-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 1.79K 6 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BY
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

MORS

Belarus · AI-generated

isp residential belarus access

The AS handle MORS-AS is held by Company with additional liability "New Technologies".

What it's used for

  • The address space carries residential and business access traffic, evidenced by reverse DNS entries like host-93-125-94-128.mors.by and netnames such as NewTech and BY-INTERNETSERVICE-20080415.
  • The network announces 1792 IPv4 addresses across 6 prefixes and maintains a single observed neighbour, a ratio characteristic of an access or eyeball network rather than a transit provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber internet access for customers in Belarus, consistent with the operator's role as a local internet service provider.

Notable

  • Registrants for five of the six prefixes are listed as Company with additional liability "New Technologies", while the largest prefix 93.125.94.0/23 is registered to Netland ODO under the netname BY-INTERNETSERVICE-20080415.
  • The address inventory is composed of small /24 blocks and one /23 block, all located in Belarus, with no IPv6 prefixes announced.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS12406Business Network Ltd455

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 6 prefixes · 1.79K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BYBelarus6

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS56497
Registry name
MORS-AS
Registrant
BYGIS-MNT
Abuse contact
nt-gomel@tut.by
Registered
2011-03-03
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS56497
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
8 naming AS56497

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check