asn.dev

Routing security

AS56479 HCT-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 80% 8 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 90% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS56479 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
31.29.64.0/19No ROAIRR53
31.29.71.0/24No ROAIRR covering1
194.170.32.0/19RPKI validIRR other origin1
195.229.175.0/24RPKI validIRR1
195.229.176.0/24RPKI validIRR54
195.229.177.0/24RPKI validIRR54
195.229.178.0/24RPKI validIRR1
195.229.179.0/24RPKI validIRR1
195.229.180.0/24RPKI validIRR1
195.229.181.0/24RPKI validIRR1

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS56479 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
194.170.32.0/19/19RIPENCC
195.229.175.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.176.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.177.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.178.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.179.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.180.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.229.181.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS56479 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
31.29.64.0/19RADBHCT via EMIXMAINT-AS89662023-11-13Announced
195.229.175.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.176.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.177.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.178.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.179.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.180.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced
195.229.181.0/24RADBe& UAE via EMIXMAINT-AS89662025-09-20Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS56479 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BTELEKOMRIPELists AS56479 as a direct member
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS56479 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS56479 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.