asn.dev

Routing security

AS55991 AS55991-36 - CNNIC ASN block

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 21 of 21 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 90% 2 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 22 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

21 observed

Every prefix observed with AS55991 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
103.43.134.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
103.43.135.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
43.228.204.0/22RPKI validIRR52
43.228.240.0/22RPKI validIRR52
45.124.76.0/24RPKI validIRR52
45.124.77.0/24RPKI validIRR52
45.124.78.0/24RPKI validIRR52
45.124.79.0/24RPKI validIRR52
103.41.116.0/22RPKI validIRR52
103.43.132.0/24RPKI validIRR4
103.56.100.0/22RPKI validIRR52
103.56.104.0/22RPKI validIRR52
103.192.208.0/22RPKI validIRR52
103.192.208.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
103.192.209.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
103.192.210.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
103.192.211.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
103.235.100.0/24RPKI validIRR covering4
103.235.101.0/24RPKI validIRR covering4
103.235.102.0/24RPKI validIRR52
103.235.103.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

22 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS55991 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS55991 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
43.228.0.0/21RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Not announced
103.43.133.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Not announced
103.235.100.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612025-02-07Not announced
43.228.204.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
43.228.240.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
45.124.76.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
45.124.77.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
45.124.78.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
45.124.79.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.41.116.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.43.132.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.56.100.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.56.104.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.192.208.0/22RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612023-11-13Announced
103.235.102.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612025-02-07Announced
103.235.103.0/24RADBXUANYUNMAINT-AS584612025-02-07Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS55991 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CTZJRADBLists AS55991 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-08 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-08. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.