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Routing security

AS55846 BBN-AS-AP - IMED, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 4 of 4 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

4 observed

Every prefix observed with AS55846 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
115.127.40.0/24RPKI validIRR51
115.127.41.0/24RPKI validIRR5
115.127.42.0/24RPKI validIRR5
115.127.43.0/24RPKI validIRR5

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS55846 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
115.127.40.0/22/22APNIC
115.127.40.0/24/24APNIC
115.127.41.0/24/24APNIC
115.127.42.0/24/24APNIC
115.127.43.0/24/24APNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS55846 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
115.127.40.0/22APNICRoute Object for CPTUMAINT-BD-BBN2014-07-22Not announced
115.127.40.0/24APNICRoute Object for CPTUMAINT-BD-BBN2010-12-08Announced
115.127.41.0/24APNICRoute Object for CPTUMAINT-BD-BBN2014-07-15Announced
115.127.42.0/24APNICRoute Object for CPTUMAINT-BD-BBN2014-07-15Announced
115.127.43.0/24APNICRoute Object for CPTUMAINT-BD-BBN2014-07-15Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS55846 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-10102APNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-58682APNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-DTLIIG-139901APNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-FGLAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-PACNET-DOWNSTREAM-SGRADBLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS55846 as a direct member
AS-SET-BSCCLAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS132267:AS-MEMBERAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS132267:AS-MEMBERSAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS132884:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS149765:AS-CORONETIIG-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS150748:AS-GMAXAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS17494:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS17806:AS-MANGOTELESERVICE-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-APRADBLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-TESTRADBLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS58717:AS-ISP-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS58717:AS-SUMMITCOMMUNICATIONS-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS58778:AS-MANGOITC-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member
AS9230:AS-BOL-BDAPNICLists AS55846 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-08 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-08. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.