asn.dev

Routing security

AS55271 ZIRO

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 2 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS55271 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
162.211.232.0/24No ROANo IRR51
162.211.233.0/24No ROANo IRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS55271 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS55271 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS55271 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ESTRUXTURE-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS55271 as a direct member
AS-GTCOMM1RADBLists AS55271 as a direct member
AS-MTO-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS55271 as a direct member
AS-NETEL-PROXYALTDBLists AS55271 as a direct member
AS32613:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS55271 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.