asn.dev

Routing security

AS55219 SOURCEFIRE-LABS

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 11 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS55219 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
172.110.204.0/22RPKI validIRR53
172.110.204.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
198.148.78.0/23RPKI validIRR52
2620:28:c000::/48RPKI validIRR30
2620:121::/44RPKI validIRR30
2620:121::/48RPKI validIRR covering31
2620:121:1::/48RPKI validIRR covering31
2620:121:2::/48RPKI validIRR covering31
2620:121:4::/48RPKI validIRR covering31
2620:121:6::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2620:121:7::/48RPKI validIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS55219 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
172.110.204.0/22/24ARIN
198.148.78.0/23/24ARIN
2620:28:c000::/48/48ARIN
2620:121::/44/48ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS55219 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
172.110.204.0/22ARINTalos OperationsMNT-CS-9852020-05-12Announced
198.148.78.0/23ARINTalos OperationsMNT-CS-9852020-05-12Announced
2620:28:c000::/48ARINTalos OperationsMNT-CS-9852020-05-12Announced
2620:121::/44ARINTalos OperationsMNT-CS-9852020-05-12Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS55219 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-EQUINIX-AMRIPELists AS55219 as a direct member
AS-TALOSARINLists AS55219 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-EURADBLists AS55219 as a direct member
AS6777:AS-AMS-IX-RSRIPELists AS55219 as a direct member
AS6777:AS-AMS-IX-RS-V6RIPELists AS55219 as a direct member
AS680:AS-AMSIX-RS-PEERSRIPELists AS55219 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.