asn.dev

Routing security

AS54665 NGN

Unclassified ARIN NSP

RPKI valid 100% 15 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS54665 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
66.128.128.0/20RPKI validIRR54
72.162.16.0/23RPKI validIRR52
162.142.80.0/21RPKI validIRR53
162.142.112.0/23RPKI validIRR52
162.220.84.0/22RPKI validIRR52
162.247.252.0/22RPKI validIRR52
192.34.172.0/22RPKI validIRR52
192.190.88.0/22RPKI validIRR52
192.195.84.0/24RPKI validIRR52
198.177.52.0/22RPKI validIRR52
199.59.112.0/22RPKI validIRR53
204.52.238.0/24RPKI validIRR51
2604:4a80::/32RPKI validIRR31
2605:9dc0::/32RPKI validIRR31
2605:4680::/32RPKI validIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS54665 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
66.128.128.0/20/20ARIN
72.162.16.0/23/23ARIN
162.142.80.0/21/21ARIN
162.142.112.0/23/23ARIN
162.220.84.0/22/22ARIN
162.247.252.0/22/22ARIN
192.34.172.0/22/22ARIN
192.190.88.0/22/22ARIN
192.195.84.0/24/24ARIN
198.177.52.0/22/22ARIN
199.59.112.0/22/22ARIN
204.52.238.0/24/24ARIN
2604:4a80::/32/32ARIN
2605:4680::/32/32ARIN
2605:9dc0::/32/32ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS54665 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
198.99.228.0/24RADBNGHS-AS21673MAINT-AS546652023-11-13Not announced
66.128.128.0/20RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
72.162.16.0/23RADBGeorgia Dept. of Technical and Adult Education (GDTAE)MAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
162.142.80.0/21RADBNGN ConnectMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
162.142.112.0/23RADBNGN ConnectMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
162.220.84.0/22RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
162.247.252.0/22RADBGunby Communications, Inc.MAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
192.34.172.0/22RADBNGNMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
192.190.88.0/22RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
192.195.84.0/24RADBNGNMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
198.177.52.0/22RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
199.59.112.0/22RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
204.52.238.0/24RADBKubota-AS398784MAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
2604:4a80::/32RADBNGNMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
2605:4680::/32RADBHEMCMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced
2605:9dc0::/32RADBNGN ConnectMAINT-AS546652023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS54665 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS54665:AS-ALLPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-DRIXALTDBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS-ETC-LEVEL3RADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS25853:AS-ETC-TRANSIT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS54665:AS-ALLRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS54665:AS-ARELIONRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS54665:AS-CIXRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS54665:AS-COGENTRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member
AS54665:AS-NTTRADBLists AS54665 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-29 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-29. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.