asn.dev

Routing security

AS53127 VB Telecom Com. e Serv. de Info Ltda

Unclassified APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 20 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 20 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS53127 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
187.110.128.0/20RPKI validIRR56
187.110.128.0/22RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.128.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.130.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.131.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
187.110.132.0/22RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.132.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.132.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.133.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
187.110.134.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.134.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
187.110.135.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
187.110.136.0/21RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.136.0/22RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.136.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.138.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.140.0/22RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.140.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
187.110.142.0/23RPKI validIRR covering51
2804:1ec::/32RPKI validIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

20 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS53127 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS53127 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
187.110.128.0/20RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced
2804:1ec::/32RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS53127 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-AMERICANTOWER-CLIENTS-OF-CLIENTSRADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-CEMIGTELECOM-CLIENTS-OF-CLIENTSRADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS113RADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS15RADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS53127 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS53127 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-01 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-01. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.