asn.dev

Routing security

AS53085 VERO S.A

Residential AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 34 of 34 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 34 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

34 observed

Every prefix observed with AS53085 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
132.255.148.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
132.255.148.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
132.255.150.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.160.0/20RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.160.0/21RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.160.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.160.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.162.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.164.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.164.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.166.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.168.0/21RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.168.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.168.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.170.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.172.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
187.33.172.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
187.33.174.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.144.0/20RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.144.0/21RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.144.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.144.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.146.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.148.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.148.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.150.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.152.0/21RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.152.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.152.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.154.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.156.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
191.5.156.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
191.5.158.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
2804:1790::/32RPKI validNo IRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS53085 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
132.255.148.0/22/24LACNIC
187.33.160.0/20/24LACNIC
191.5.144.0/20/24LACNIC
2804:1790::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS53085 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS53085 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-267613RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-8167-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-8167_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-AS393742NTTCOMLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS15RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS228RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS80RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-4RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-HUGENET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-SB-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS28146:AS-CLIENTSRADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS53085 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS53085 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.