asn.dev

Routing security

AS52686 F.J.FANTINI AMPARO ME

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 16 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52686 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
138.99.204.0/22RPKI validNo IRR55
138.99.204.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
138.99.206.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
170.246.80.0/22RPKI validNo IRR54
170.246.80.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
170.246.82.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
177.67.156.0/22RPKI validNo IRR55
177.67.156.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
177.67.158.0/23RPKI validNo IRR11
2804:2440::/32RPKI validNo IRR31
2804:2440::/33RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:2440::/34RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:2440:4000::/34RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:2440:8000::/33RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:2440:8000::/34RPKI validNo IRR19
2804:2440:c000::/34RPKI validNo IRR19

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52686 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
138.99.204.0/22/32LACNIC
170.246.80.0/22/32LACNIC
177.67.156.0/22/32LACNIC
2804:2440::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS52686 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52686 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AMERICANTOWER-CLIENTS-OF-CLIENTSRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS14RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS209RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS99RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-1RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-GNT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-ITXBRRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS53158RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS52320:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS52925:AS-CONERADBLists AS52686 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS52686 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.