asn.dev

Routing security

AS52671 Confederacao Nacional das Cooperativas do Sicoob

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 22 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 22 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

22 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52671 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
177.53.248.0/21No ROAIRR51
177.53.248.0/23No ROAIRR covering53
177.53.248.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
177.53.249.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
177.53.250.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
177.53.250.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
177.53.251.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
177.53.252.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
177.53.252.0/24No ROAIRR53
177.53.253.0/24No ROAIRR53
177.53.254.0/23No ROAIRR53
177.53.254.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
177.53.255.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
2804:c14::/34No ROAIRR covering30
2804:c14::/35No ROAIRR covering31
2804:c14::/48No ROAIRR covering31
2804:c14:2000::/35No ROAIRR covering30
2804:c14:2000::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:c14:4000::/35No ROAIRR covering31
2804:c14:4000::/48No ROAIRR covering31
2804:c14:6000::/35No ROAIRR31
2804:c14:6000::/48No ROAIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52671 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS52671 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2804:c14::/32RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Not announced
177.53.248.0/21RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced
177.53.252.0/24RADBSAMM - Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS223812026-08-21Announced
177.53.253.0/24RADBSAMM - Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS223812026-08-23Announced
177.53.254.0/23RADBSAMM - Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS223812026-08-23Announced
2804:c14:6000::/35RADBSAMM - Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS223812026-08-23Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52671 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-8167-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS-8167_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-05RADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS262468:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52671 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS52671 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-20 11:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-20. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.