asn.dev

Routing security

AS52662 TELECALL TELECOMUNICACOES

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 25 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 25 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

25 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52662 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
177.67.24.0/22No ROAIRR54
177.67.24.0/23No ROAIRR covering15
177.67.24.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
177.67.25.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
177.67.26.0/23No ROAIRR covering15
177.67.26.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
177.67.27.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.128.0/20No ROAIRR54
189.113.128.0/21No ROAIRR covering14
189.113.130.0/24No ROAIRR covering3
189.113.132.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.133.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.134.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.135.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.136.0/21No ROAIRR covering15
189.113.136.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.137.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.138.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.139.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.140.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.142.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
189.113.143.0/24No ROAIRR covering13
2804:33b0::/32No ROAIRR34
2804:33b0::/33No ROAIRR covering27
2804:33b0:8000::/33No ROAIRR covering27

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52662 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS52662 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
177.67.24.0/22RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced
189.113.128.0/20RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced
2804:33b0::/32RADBTelecall BRMAINT-AS626632023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52662 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-28124RADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS23RADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-1RADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-FLYSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-GNT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-SB-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-TLCRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-TLC-GROUPRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS52320:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS52662 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS52662 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.