asn.dev

Routing security

AS52539 SBS-NET TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA ME

Unclassified APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 17 of 17 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

17 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52539 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
179.106.176.0/20RPKI validIRR55
179.106.176.0/21RPKI validIRR covering53
179.106.176.0/22RPKI validIRR covering15
179.106.176.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.178.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.180.0/22RPKI validIRR covering15
179.106.180.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.182.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.184.0/21RPKI validIRR covering53
179.106.184.0/22RPKI validIRR covering15
179.106.184.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.186.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.188.0/22RPKI validIRR covering15
179.106.188.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
179.106.190.0/23RPKI validIRR covering13
2804:3404::/32RPKI validIRR31
2804:3404:400::/39RPKI validIRR covering18

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52539 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
179.106.176.0/20/24LACNIC
2804:3404::/32/32LACNIC
2804:3404:400::/39/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS52539 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
179.106.176.0/20RADBITX-SAMMMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced
2804:3404::/32RADBITX-SAMMMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52539 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS52539:AS-CUSTOMERSPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-21574-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-AMERICANTOWERRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-AMERICANTOWER-CLIENTS-OF-CLIENTSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-CEMIGTELECOM-CLIENTS-OF-CLIENTSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS13RADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-1RADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-FASTNETRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-OPENX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS52531:AS-CONERADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS52531:AS-DLINFORMATICANTTCOMLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS52531:AS-DLINFORMATICARADBLists AS52539 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS52539 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-24 19:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-24. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.