asn.dev

Routing security

AS52330 S3WIRELESS COLOMBIA S.A

Unclassified LACNIC NSP

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 13 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52330 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
168.227.104.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
168.227.105.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
168.227.106.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.184.200.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.184.201.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.184.202.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
190.184.203.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.184.204.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.184.205.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
190.184.206.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
190.184.207.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
2803:8340::/32RPKI validIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

13 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52330 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
168.227.104.0/22/24LACNIC
190.184.200.0/21/21LACNIC
190.184.200.0/21/24LACNIC
190.184.200.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.201.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.202.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.203.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.204.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.205.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.206.0/24/24LACNIC
190.184.207.0/24/24LACNIC
2803:8340::/32/32LACNIC
2803:8340:ffff::/48/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS52330 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
168.227.104.0/22RADBS3 WirelessMAINT-AS235202023-11-13Not announced
190.184.200.0/21RADBS3 WirelessMAINT-AS235202023-11-13Not announced
2803:8340::/32RADBITX-CUSTOMER-S3WIRELESSMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52330 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-S3WIRELESSPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-19429RADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS-GNT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS-ITXCOLRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS-NWN-TRANSITRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS14080:AS-CLAROLACNICLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS19429:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member
AS52320:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS52330 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.