asn.dev

Routing security

AS52053 REDHEBERG

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS52053 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a13:9500:e7::/48RPKI validIRR19
2a14:1d00::/44RPKI validIRR32
155.117.152.0/24RPKI validIRR51
170.39.216.0/24RPKI validIRR53
170.39.218.0/24RPKI validIRR51
185.255.112.0/24RPKI validIRR53
193.38.250.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS52053 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.137.69.0/24/24RIPENCC
155.117.152.0/24/24RIPENCC
170.39.216.0/24/24ARIN
170.39.218.0/24/24ARIN
185.255.112.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.38.250.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a10:4646:900::/44/48RIPENCC
2a13:9500:e7::/48/48RIPENCC
2a14:1d00::/44/44RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

2 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS49434FBW NETWORKS SASDeclaredObserved
AS39948612651980 CANADA INC.DeclaredObserved
AS212815Dyjix SASnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS52053 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a10:4646:900::/44RIPE—MNT-FR-SCALYNET-12026-07-14Not announced
155.117.152.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-05-27Announced
155.117.152.0/24RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-05-27Announced
170.39.216.0/24ARINREDHEBERG SASMNT-FRF-272024-07-31Announced
170.39.218.0/24ARINREDHEBERG SASMNT-FRF-272025-01-24Announced
185.255.112.0/24RIPE—CIDR-EU-MNT2023-09-29Announced
193.38.250.0/24RIPE—CIDR-EU-MNT2023-06-20Announced
2a13:9500:e7::/48RADBUsed by EndUserMAINT-AS8342025-09-21Announced
2a13:9500:e7::/48RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2025-09-21Announced
2a14:1d00::/44RIPE—FR-REDHEBERG-MNT2023-12-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS52053 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS52053 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS52053 as a direct member
AS52053:AS-REDHEBERGRIPELists AS52053 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.