asn.dev

Routing security

AS51691 FSOL-AS

Unclassified RIPE NSP

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS51691 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:4cc1::/32RPKI validIRR29
2a00:4cc2::/32RPKI validIRR29
37.16.96.0/20RPKI validIRR52
178.213.232.0/21RPKI validIRR52
178.213.238.0/23RPKI validIRR52
178.213.239.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS51691 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
37.16.96.0/20/23RIPENCC
37.16.112.0/20/20RIPENCC
178.213.232.0/21/21RIPENCC
178.213.238.0/23/23RIPENCC
178.213.239.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a00:4cc1::/32/48RIPENCC
2a00:4cc1:2501::/64/64RIPENCC
2a00:4cc2::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS51691 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
37.16.96.0/21RIPEF-SolutionsFSOL-MNT2015-10-19Not announced
37.16.96.0/22RIPEF-SolutionsFSOL-MNT2015-10-19Not announced
37.16.104.0/21RIPEF-SolutionsFSOL-MNT2015-10-19Not announced
37.16.104.0/22RIPEF-SolutionsFSOL-MNT2015-10-19Not announced
37.16.110.0/23RIPEF-SolutionsFSOL-MNT2015-10-19Not announced
37.16.112.0/20RIPEF-Solutions Oy Rauma emergency announce from OuluFSOL-MNT2012-01-17Not announced
2a00:4cc1:2501::/64RIPE—FSOL-MNT2023-07-18Not announced
37.16.96.0/20RIPEF-Solutions Oy OuluFSOL-MNT2012-01-17Announced
178.213.232.0/21RIPEF-Solutions OyFSOL-MNT2011-12-04Announced
178.213.238.0/23RIPE—FSOL-MNT2025-12-08Announced
178.213.239.0/24RIPE—FSOL-MNT2023-07-18Announced
2a00:4cc1::/32RIPEF-Solutions Oy NorthFSOL-MNT2015-02-14Announced
2a00:4cc2::/32RIPE—FSOL-MNT2025-12-08Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS51691 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-SET-FSOLPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-NETPLAZARIPELists AS51691 as a direct member
AS-SET-FSOLRIPELists AS51691 as a direct member
AS-TSF-NATIONALRIPELists AS51691 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-29 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-30. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.