asn.dev

Routing security

AS51162 PFNB-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 67% 6 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 3 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS51162 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
77.220.207.0/24No ROAIRR55
91.147.115.0/24No ROAIRR covering54
109.233.206.0/24No ROAIRR56
77.220.206.0/24RPKI validIRR57
91.103.106.0/24RPKI validIRR55
91.103.107.0/24RPKI validIRR55
91.147.112.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
91.147.113.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
91.216.178.0/24RPKI validIRR56

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS51162 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
77.220.206.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.103.106.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.103.107.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.147.112.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.147.113.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.216.178.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS51162 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
91.147.112.0/22RIPEKazteleport ALA RouteKAZTELEPORT-MNT2024-03-05Not announced
2a07:1e02::/48RIPEDC_TEST_IPv6KAZTELEPORT-MNT2023-07-11Not announced
77.220.206.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-MNT2017-12-28Announced
77.220.207.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-DC-MNT2020-04-05Announced
91.103.106.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-DC-MNT2019-01-14Announced
91.103.107.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-DC-MNT2019-01-14Announced
91.216.178.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-DC-MNT2020-03-31Announced
109.233.206.0/24RIPE—KAZTELEPORT-DC-MNT2021-03-18Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS51162 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ALM-KTPRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-DDOS-GUARDRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-INTELSOFTRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-KAZTELECOMPEERSRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-KTCPEERSRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-SET_KTP-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-SMARTNET-PEERSRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-TRANSKZRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS-TRANSKZ-IPV6RIPELists AS51162 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTAPNICLists AS51162 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTRADBLists AS51162 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIATESTAPNICLists AS51162 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIATEST2APNICLists AS51162 as a direct member
AS59692:AS-IQWEBRIPELists AS51162 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 18:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.