asn.dev

Routing security

AS50906 LUCIAD

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 2 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS50906 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
91.216.20.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2001:67c:1cc::/48RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS50906 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.216.20.0/24/24RIPENCC
2001:67c:1cc::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS50906 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
91.216.20.0/24RIPELuciad NetworkLUCIAD-MNT2010-04-19Announced
2001:67c:1cc::/48RIPELuciad NetworkLUCIAD-MNT2010-07-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS50906 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-OPENMINDSRIPELists AS50906 as a direct member
AS-TELENETRIPELists AS50906 as a direct member
AS-UNIXSOLUTIONSRIPELists AS50906 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.