asn.dev

Routing security

AS50881 ESET-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 15 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS50881 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a05:e800:1::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a05:e800:99::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a05:e800:1001::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a05:e800:1003::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a05:e800:1007::/48RPKI validIRR30
2a05:e802:1005::/48RPKI validIRR29
38.90.226.0/24RPKI validIRR51
38.90.227.0/24RPKI validIRR51
91.228.164.0/24RPKI validIRR52
91.228.165.0/24RPKI validIRR52
91.228.166.0/24RPKI validIRR52
91.228.167.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.94.157.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.94.158.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.94.159.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS50881 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
38.90.226.0/24/24ARIN
38.90.227.0/24/24ARIN
91.228.164.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.228.165.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.228.166.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.228.167.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.94.157.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.94.158.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.94.159.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a05:e800:1::/48/48RIPENCC
2a05:e800:99::/48/48RIPENCC
2a05:e800:1001::/48/48RIPENCC
2a05:e800:1003::/48/48RIPENCC
2a05:e800:1007::/48/48RIPENCC
2a05:e802:1005::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS50881 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
38.90.226.0/24ARINRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - ESET, LLC.MNT-COGC2026-03-16Announced
38.90.227.0/24ARINRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - ESET, LLC.MNT-COGC2026-03-16Announced
91.228.164.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-08Announced
91.228.165.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-09Announced
91.228.166.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-09Announced
91.228.167.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-09Announced
185.94.157.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-08Announced
185.94.158.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-08Announced
185.94.159.0/24RIPEESET NETESETSK-MNT2015-09-08Announced
2a05:e800:1::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2026-02-24Announced
2a05:e800:99::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2026-06-15Announced
2a05:e800:1001::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2024-03-11Announced
2a05:e800:1003::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2024-03-11Announced
2a05:e800:1007::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2024-03-11Announced
2a05:e802:1005::/48RIPE—ESETSK-MNT2024-03-11Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS50881 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BENESTRARIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS-OSK-DNIRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS-SLOVAKRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS-SWANRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS-VNETRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS1299:AS-TWELVE99-EU-V4RIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS1299:AS-TWELVE99-EU-V6RIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS15962:AS-OSK-DNIRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member
AS29405:AS-VNETRIPELists AS50881 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.