asn.dev

Routing security

AS50758 AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 14 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS50758 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
46.31.160.0/21RPKI validIRR52
46.31.160.0/24RPKI validIRR50
46.31.161.0/24RPKI validIRR50
46.31.162.0/24RPKI validIRR50
46.31.163.0/24RPKI validIRR covering50
46.31.164.0/24RPKI validIRR covering50
46.31.165.0/24RPKI validIRR covering50
46.31.166.0/24RPKI validIRR covering50
46.31.167.0/24RPKI validIRR50
213.190.12.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.190.13.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.190.14.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.190.15.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

14 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS50758 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.31.160.0/21/24RIPENCC
46.31.160.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.161.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.162.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.163.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.164.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.165.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.166.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.31.167.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.190.12.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.190.13.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.190.14.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.190.15.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0a:2a40::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS50758 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
213.190.12.0/22RIPE—MNT-ASTRIUMSAS2021-12-27Not announced
2a0a:2a40::/29RIPE—MNT-ASTRIUMSAS2017-03-28Not announced
46.31.160.0/21RIPEAS50758 range 46.31.160.0/21MNT-ASTRIUMSAS2011-08-11Announced
46.31.160.0/24RIPEAS50758 range 46.31.160.0/24AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-SAS-MNT2022-09-23Announced
46.31.161.0/24RIPEAS50758 range 46.31.161.0/24AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-SAS-MNT2022-09-23Announced
46.31.162.0/24RIPEAS50758 range 46.31.162.0/24MNT-ASTRIUMSAS2016-09-12Announced
46.31.167.0/24RIPE—MNT-ASTRIUMSAS2017-05-22Announced
213.190.12.0/24RIPE—AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-SAS-MNT2022-09-23Announced
213.190.13.0/24RIPE—AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-MNT2021-12-27Announced
213.190.14.0/24RIPE—AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-SAS-MNT2026-01-28Announced
213.190.15.0/24RIPE—AIRBUS-DEFENCE-AND-SPACE-SAS-MNT2026-01-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS50758 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-20900RIPELists AS50758 as a direct member
AS-RAINRIPELists AS50758 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS50758 as a direct member
AS-SET-IMSRIPELists AS50758 as a direct member
AS-SKYVISIONRIPELists AS50758 as a direct member
AS57866:AS-FUSIXRIPELists AS50758 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.