Autonomous system
AS50257 AMOBILE-AS JV A-Mobile Ltd.
Mobile RIPE NSP
Summary
A-Mobile
isp mobile eyeball
A-Mobile (JV A-Mobile Ltd.) — a mobile operator serving Abkhazia, a partially recognized region on the Black Sea coast (internationally regarded as part of Georgia). Its infrastructure is located around Sokhumi.
What it's used for
- Mobile voice and data for subscribers in Abkhazia.
Notable
- A small consumer "eyeball" network — its traffic shows the day/night rhythm typical of a network serving end-user mobile devices.
- Operates in a small, politically contested market; one of the region's two mobile operators.
Interesting
- Networks in partially recognized territories like Abkhazia often route through and register via neighboring states, which can make their geolocation and ownership records ambiguous.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 3.07K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS50257- Registry name
- AMOBILE-AS
- Registrant
- MNT-A-MOBILE
- Abuse contact
- Adgur.Grivapsh@a-mobile.biz
- Registered
- 2009-12-10
- Last changed
- 2026-08-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- A-Mobile
- Also known as
- A-Mobile
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-AMOBILE- Website
- https://a-mobile.biz/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 18 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 18 authorising AS50257
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 18 of 18 announcements
- Route objects
- 18 naming AS50257
Reputation
Classification and threat
Mobile Cellular carrier. Addresses are shared by many handsets via CGNAT.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,846 prefixes, as published 2026-11-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere