asn.dev

Routing security

AS50188 KOLNET

Unclassified RIPE Enterprise

RPKI valid 100% 11 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 11 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS50188 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
88.135.160.0/20RPKI validIRR52
95.215.192.0/21RPKI validIRR52
95.215.192.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.193.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.194.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.195.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.196.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.197.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.198.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.215.199.0/24RPKI validIRR52
213.5.248.0/21RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

11 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS50188 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
88.135.160.0/20/20RIPENCC
95.215.192.0/21/21RIPENCC
95.215.192.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.193.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.194.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.195.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.196.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.197.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.198.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.199.0/24/24RIPENCC
213.5.248.0/21/21RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

18 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS50188 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
88.135.176.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2022-02-14Not announced
88.135.177.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2022-02-14Not announced
88.135.178.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2022-02-14Not announced
88.135.179.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2022-02-14Not announced
2001:67c:1b4::/48RIPEKOLNETSC IPv6 ProvidingKOLNET-MNT2010-03-19Not announced
2a10:f781:10:b21b::/64RIPEEPIX-LORA-KOLNETCZEEPOLUDNIE-MNT2022-05-16Not announced
2a13:2801:9000::/36RIPEKOLNET Sp. z o.o. - IPv6 aggregateFIXMAP-MNT2025-11-18Not announced
88.135.160.0/20RIPEKOLNET Sp. z o.o. subscribersKOLNET-MNT2022-02-18Announced
95.215.192.0/21RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2024-06-11Announced
95.215.192.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2024-06-11Announced
95.215.193.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2024-06-11Announced
95.215.194.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2023-12-28Announced
95.215.195.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2024-04-26Announced
95.215.196.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2024-01-09Announced
95.215.197.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2023-03-30Announced
95.215.198.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2023-03-30Announced
95.215.199.0/24RIPE—KOLNET-MNT2023-10-23Announced
213.5.248.0/21RIPEKOLNET Sp. z o.o. subscribersKOLNET-MNT2022-02-18Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS50188 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-KOLNETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-CIXRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-ENET24RIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-KOLNETRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-M3NETRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS-VIRTUAOPERATORRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS202520:AS-CLIENTSRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS29535:AS-MIX2RIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS51465:AS-FIXMAPRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS51465:AS-FIXMAP-ISPSRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member
AS59832:AS-NASK-FXRIPELists AS50188 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.