asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS49392 ASBAXETN

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 5.89K 16 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 4 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Baxet

Russian Federation · AI-generated

business telecom russia

ASBAXETN is operated by LLC Baxet.

What it's used for

  • The address space is registered under netnames such as RU-BAXET-20190603, BG-NETWORK, and BX-NETWORK, with registrants listed as LLC Baxet and Baxet Group Inc.
  • The AS announces 5,888 IPv4 addresses across 16 prefixes and 4 IPv6 prefixes, while maintaining only 4 observed routing neighbours, indicating a role focused on internal corporate or service delivery rather than transit.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of endpoints for Baxet's telecommunications services, including VoIP and data connectivity infrastructure.

Notable

  • Registrants are consistent with the announcer, primarily listing LLC Baxet and Baxet Group Inc., with one prefix (193.53.126.0/23) registered to LIR Limited.
  • The inventory is composed of multiple /23 and /24 blocks, reflecting a segmented corporate estate rather than a single contiguous allocation.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 2 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS39238OKB PROGRESS LLC651
AS12389PJSC Rostelecom504

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 16 prefixes · 5.89K addresses IPv6 4 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation20

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS49392
Registry name
ASBAXETN
Registrant
BX-NOC
Abuse contact
noc@baxet.ru
Registered
2019-01-18
Last changed
2020-07-12
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
19% valid · 4 valid, 17 with no ROA
ROAs
7 authorising AS49392
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 21 of 21 announcements
Route objects
28 naming AS49392

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

2 IC3 indicators addresses in this network appear in FBI IC3 cybersecurity advisories.

PrefixAdvisoryPublished
45.8.158.64China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems2026-08-26
45.8.159.228China-Linked Hacking Group QTFY Targets Military and Critical Infrastructure with Malicious Distributed Systems2026-08-26

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check