asn.dev

Routing security

AS49111 INET-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 89% 16 of 18 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 16 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

18 observed

Every prefix observed with AS49111 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:7300::/29No ROAIRR30
2a12:6100::/29No ROAIRR30
2a0e:9c0::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a0e:98c0::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a11:8c80::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a11:8cc0::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a11:6700::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:1ec0::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:1f40::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:7d00::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:3240::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:4680::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:4980::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:6980::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:9180::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:be00::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:da00::/29RPKI validIRR30
2a12:e900::/29RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

16 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS49111 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2a0e:9c0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a0e:98c0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a11:6700::/29/29RIPENCC
2a11:8c80::/29/29RIPENCC
2a11:8cc0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:1ec0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:1f40::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:3240::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:4680::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:4980::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:6980::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:7d00::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:9180::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:be00::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:da00::/29/29RIPENCC
2a12:e900::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

18 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS49111 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0e:9c0::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a0e:7300::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-17Announced
2a0e:98c0::/29RIPE—T-MNT2024-06-21Announced
2a11:6700::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a11:8c80::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a11:8cc0::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:1ec0::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:1f40::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:3240::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:4680::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:4980::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:6100::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-17Announced
2a12:6980::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:7d00::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:9180::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:be00::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:da00::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced
2a12:e900::/29RIPE—T-MNT2025-07-21Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS49111 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BXSRIPELists AS49111 as a direct member
AS31359:AS-CUSTOMERS-YEKRIPELists AS49111 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.