asn.dev

Routing security

AS48648 KYIVLINK

Residential ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 14 of 14 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

14 observed

Every prefix observed with AS48648 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0a:2c0::/48RPKI validIRR35
2a0a:2c0:2::/48RPKI validIRR35
91.198.233.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.211.120.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.211.122.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.190.151.0/24RPKI validIRR53
193.107.80.0/24RPKI validIRR53
193.107.134.0/24RPKI validIRR53
194.28.100.0/24RPKI validIRR53
194.28.103.0/24RPKI validIRR53
195.12.56.0/22RPKI validIRR53
195.12.56.0/24RPKI validIRR53
195.12.59.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
195.88.27.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS48648 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.198.233.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.211.120.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.211.122.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.190.151.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.107.80.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.107.134.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.28.100.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.28.103.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.12.56.0/22/22RIPENCC
195.12.56.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.12.57.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.12.59.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.88.27.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0a:2c0::/48/48RIPENCC
2a0a:2c0:2::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS48648 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
195.88.26.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2026-05-12Not announced
91.198.233.0/24RIPEISP KyivLinkK-LINK-MNT2016-12-05Announced
91.211.120.0/24RIPEISP KyivLinkK-LINK-MNT2014-05-26Announced
91.211.122.0/24RIPEISP KyivLinkK-LINK-MNT2023-05-05Announced
185.190.151.0/24RIPEKyivLinkK-LINK-MNT2025-05-27Announced
193.107.80.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2024-03-11Announced
193.107.134.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2026-08-24Announced
194.28.100.0/24RIPEKyivLink NAT poolK-LINK-MNT2025-05-28Announced
194.28.103.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2024-10-01Announced
195.12.56.0/22RIPEISP KyivLinkK-LINK-MNT2012-11-07Announced
195.12.56.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2024-09-14Announced
195.88.27.0/24RIPE—K-LINK-MNT2026-05-12Announced
2a0a:2c0::/48RIPEKyivLink IPv6 infrastructureK-LINK-MNT2018-05-11Announced
2a0a:2c0:2::/48RIPEKyivLink IPv6 infrastructureK-LINK-MNT2018-05-22Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS48648 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-KLNKRIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-KLNK-V6RIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-RUDAKI-IXRIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS29535:AS-TPIXRIPELists AS48648 as a direct member
AS49706:AS-RVIXRIPELists AS48648 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.