Autonomous system
AS4785 XTOM-AS-JP xTom
Residential APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP
Summary
xTom Japan
hosting transit legacy
XTOM-AS-JP — the Japanese network of xTom, an infrastructure-as-a-service
provider offering colocation, dedicated servers, and wholesale IP transit.
What it's used for
- Colocation and server hosting in Tokyo and Osaka.
- Wholesale connectivity and IP transit, with peering across Japanese exchanges.
Notable
- xTom was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in Germany, operating through local subsidiaries including xTom Japan Corporation.
- The network peers at major Japanese exchange points and interconnects with the large domestic carriers, positioning itself as a low-cost route into the Japanese market for foreign networks.
Interesting
- This is a hosting and transit network, so addresses behind it are servers and downstream networks — a very different profile from the consumer ISPs that dominate nearby AS numbers in this range.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| JP | Japan | 72 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS4785- Registry name
- XTOM-AS-JP
- Registrant
- xTom Limited
- Abuse contact
- noc@xtom.com
- Registered
- 2018-02-22
- Last changed
- 2020-05-12
- Status
- active
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- xTom Osaka
- Also known as
- xTom
- Network type
- Cable/DSL/ISP
- Scope
- Asia Pacific
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-XTOM- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 6 facilities
- Website
- https://xtom.com/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere