asn.dev

Routing security

AS47516 DEHOST-INTERNET-VE-BILISIM-TEKNOLOJILERI-SAN-TIC-LTD-STI DEHOST INTERNET VE BILISIM TEKNOLOJILERI SANAYI TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI

Unclassified RIPE Content

RPKI valid 100% 11 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS47516 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
5.10.220.0/24RPKI validIRR53
5.178.111.0/24RPKI validIRR53
13.143.223.0/24RPKI validIRR53
31.77.69.0/24RPKI validIRR53
45.87.120.0/24RPKI validIRR53
45.143.4.0/24RPKI validIRR53
50.114.185.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.132.49.0/24RPKI validIRR53
166.1.91.0/24RPKI validIRR53
166.1.94.0/24RPKI validIRR53
185.136.206.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS47516 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
5.10.220.0/24/24RIPENCC
5.178.111.0/24/24RIPENCC
13.143.223.0/24/24RIPENCC
31.77.69.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.87.120.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.143.4.0/24/24RIPENCC
50.114.185.0/24/24ARIN
91.132.49.0/24/24RIPENCC
166.1.91.0/24/24ARIN
166.1.94.0/24/24ARIN
185.136.206.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a11:5dc0:52::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS47516 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a11:5dc0:52::/48RIPE—LIR-TR-PHBILISIM-1-MNT2026-03-18Not announced
5.10.220.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2025-03-27Announced
5.178.111.0/24RIPE—LIR-AE-RCSTECHNOLOGIES-1-MNT2023-10-13Announced
13.143.223.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2026-07-29Announced
31.77.69.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2026-09-11Announced
45.87.120.0/24RIPE—LIR-AE-RCSTECHNOLOGIES-1-MNT2024-08-22Announced
45.143.4.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2025-11-20Announced
50.114.185.0/24ARIN727 North 1550 EastMNT-ADC-962025-09-23Announced
91.132.49.0/24RIPE—INTERLIR-MNT2024-02-28Announced
166.1.91.0/24ARINcustomer subnetMNT-ADC-962025-12-19Announced
166.1.94.0/24ARINcustomer subnetMNT-ADC-962026-05-05Announced
185.136.206.0/24RIPE—LIR-TR-MEHMET3-1-MNT2024-08-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS47516 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS47516:AS-DEHOSTPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-DIRECTONERIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-NETUWEBRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-RDSNETRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-RTDRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-SNRNETRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRADBLists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-STORMWALL-SETRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS199310:AS-DOWNSTREAMRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS202782:AS-DOWNSTREAMRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS202782:AS-EVERLINKALTDBLists AS47516 as a direct member
AS202782:AS-EVERLINKRADBLists AS47516 as a direct member
AS209451:AS-ROUTEFENCERIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS209474:AS-EKIPHOSTRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS219384:AS-SATCORERIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS44620:AS-TRES-DDOS-GUARDRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member
AS47516:AS-DEHOSTRIPELists AS47516 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-21 12:00 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-21. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.