asn.dev

Routing security

AS46294 SCATUI

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 71% 12 of 17 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 5 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

17 observed

Every prefix observed with AS46294 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
38.29.208.0/22No ROAIRR51
38.29.228.0/23No ROAIRR51
38.89.100.0/23No ROAIRR51
38.89.100.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
38.89.101.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
76.77.18.0/23RPKI validIRR51
76.77.18.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
76.77.19.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
76.77.20.0/24RPKI validIRR51
104.255.72.0/22RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.72.0/23RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.74.0/23RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.76.0/23RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.76.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.77.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.78.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
104.255.79.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS46294 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
76.77.18.0/23/24ARIN
76.77.20.0/24/24ARIN
104.255.72.0/21/24ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS46294 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
38.105.17.0/24RADBProxy route for AVC by MzimaMAINT-AS32572023-11-13Not announced
67.201.54.0/24RADBProxy route for AVC by MzimaMAINT-AS32572023-11-13Not announced
104.255.72.0/21ARIN10 Telecom LaneMNT-SCATU-32023-08-22Not announced
38.29.208.0/22RADBRegistered for Cogent Communications Customer - Triplet Mountain CommunicationsMAINT-AS1742025-03-31Announced
38.29.228.0/23ALTDBProxy registration to prevent harm from ARIN-NONAUTH shutdownMAINT-AS70342022-04-04Announced
38.89.100.0/23RADBRegistered for Cogent Communications Customer - Triplet Mountain CommunicationsMAINT-AS1742025-03-31Announced
76.77.18.0/23ARIN6129 79th StreetMNT-NETWO-1622025-10-31Announced
76.77.20.0/24ALTDBProxy registration to prevent harm from ARIN-NONAUTH shutdownMAINT-AS70342022-04-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS46294 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-32098RADBLists AS46294 as a direct member
AS-CBL1-ALL-AS-NUMBERSARINLists AS46294 as a direct member
AS-CBL1-AS46294ARINLists AS46294 as a direct member
AS-MZIMA-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS46294 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-25 14:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-25. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.