asn.dev

Routing security

AS44814 BTEL-BG-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 16 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS44814 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a01:4a40::/29RPKI validIRR31
46.253.8.0/24RPKI validIRR52
46.253.10.0/24RPKI validIRR52
46.253.15.0/24RPKI validIRR52
93.94.136.0/24RPKI validIRR52
93.94.137.0/24RPKI validIRR52
93.94.138.0/24RPKI validIRR53
93.94.141.0/24RPKI validIRR52
93.94.143.0/24RPKI validIRR53
95.169.208.0/20RPKI validIRR52
95.169.213.0/24RPKI validIRR52
95.169.219.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

16 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS44814 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.253.8.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.253.10.0/24/24RIPENCC
46.253.15.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.94.136.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.94.137.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.94.138.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.94.141.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.94.143.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.169.208.0/20/20RIPENCC
95.169.213.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.169.218.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.169.219.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.169.222.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.7.217.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a01:4a40::/29/29RIPENCC
2a01:4a40::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

17 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS44814 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
95.169.195.0/24RIPE—BTEL-MNT2026-08-21Not announced
95.169.218.0/23RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2012-10-18Not announced
95.169.218.0/24RIPEIsiCommunicationsBTEL-MNT2015-02-10Not announced
95.169.220.0/23RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2014-03-05Not announced
2a01:4a40:101::/48RIPE—BTEL-MNT2026-04-20Not announced
46.253.8.0/24RIPEBTEL Route Object - PABTEL-MNT2011-07-27Announced
46.253.10.0/24RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2012-10-15Announced
46.253.15.0/24RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2012-03-23Announced
93.94.136.0/24RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2010-01-14Announced
93.94.137.0/24RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2014-09-26Announced
93.94.138.0/24RIPEBTEL Route Object - PABTEL-MNT2011-04-28Announced
93.94.141.0/24RIPEBTEL Route ObjectBTEL-MNT2014-03-05Announced
93.94.143.0/24RIPE—BTEL-MNT2020-08-21Announced
95.169.208.0/20RIPEBTEL Route Object - PABTEL-MNT2012-03-29Announced
95.169.213.0/24RIPEBTEL Route Object - PABTEL-MNT2012-10-11Announced
95.169.219.0/24RIPEBulgartelBTEL-MNT2015-02-10Announced
2a01:4a40::/29RIPE—BTEL-MNT2024-08-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS44814 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AKTONRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-BTC-UPRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-BTELOUTRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-BTELOUT-V6RIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-DPT-OUTRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-ITVNETRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-NETGUARDBGRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS-VARNAIXRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS203462:AS-NVC-DECIX_FRA_RSRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member
AS8218:AS-AMSIX-RSRIPELists AS44814 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 18:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.