asn.dev

Routing security

AS43364 MEDIANET-AS MEDIANET S.R.L.

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 23 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 23 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

23 observed

Every prefix observed with AS43364 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
92.245.164.0/22No ROAIRR50
92.245.164.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.165.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.166.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.167.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.176.0/22No ROAIRR50
92.245.176.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.177.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.178.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.179.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
92.245.189.0/24No ROAIRR50
149.100.161.0/24No ROAIRR51
149.100.166.0/23No ROAIRR51
149.100.166.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
149.100.167.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
185.212.152.0/22No ROAIRR50
185.212.152.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
185.212.153.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
185.212.154.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
185.212.155.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
213.178.222.0/23No ROAIRR50
213.178.222.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
213.178.223.0/24No ROAIRR covering51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS43364 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS43364 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2001:678:d4::/48RIPEMEDI@NET S.R.L.AS6734-MNT2015-12-24Not announced
2a0f:d80::/32RIPE—IT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2022-10-10Not announced
92.245.164.0/22RIPEMedianet wireless networksIT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2021-06-29Announced
92.245.176.0/22RIPEMedianet wireless networksIT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2021-06-29Announced
92.245.189.0/24RIPEMedianetitaliaIT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2021-06-29Announced
149.100.161.0/24RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer Medi@net S.r.l.MAINT-AS1742023-11-13Announced
149.100.166.0/23RADBRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - Medi@net S.r.l.MAINT-AS1742023-11-13Announced
185.212.152.0/22RIPE—IT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2017-07-21Announced
213.178.222.0/23RIPEMedianet wireless networksIT-MEDIANETSRL-1-MNT2021-06-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS43364 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-FASTWEBRIPELists AS43364 as a direct member
AS-IBSCUSTRIPELists AS43364 as a direct member
AS-TISCALICUSTOMERSRIPELists AS43364 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-09 13:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-09. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.