asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS42770 KRT-AS

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 2.82K 3 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Kar-Tel

Kazakhstan · AI-generated

mobile residential kzt

KRT-AS is operated by Kar-Tel LLC.

What it's used for

  • The address space carries mobile and residential traffic, indicated by netnames such as KZ-IPNET-KAR-TEL-20070413 and KZ-IPNET-KAR-TEL-20111129.
  • The AS announces 2,816 IPv4 addresses across 3 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, with only 3 observed neighbours, a ratio consistent with an access network rather than a transit provider.
  • Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber eyeballs for mobile and fixed-line internet access in Kazakhstan.

Notable

  • Registrants for all announced prefixes are listed as Kar-Tel LLP and Kar-Tel LLC, aligning with the AS holder.
  • Kar-Tel is the operating entity for the Beeline mobile brand in Kazakhstan, a subsidiary of VEON Group.
  • The inventory includes a US-originated prefix (198.45.116.0/24) alongside Kazakhstan-allocated space.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS35168TNS-Plus LLP585
AS21299Kar-Tel LLC102

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 3 prefixes · 2.82K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KZKazakhstan4

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS42770
Registry name
KRT-AS
Registrant
kz-ipnet-kar-tel-1-mnt
Abuse contact
ripe-kartel-mobile@beeline.kz
Registered
2007-04-13
Last changed
2021-04-12
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 11 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS42770
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
Route objects
13 naming AS42770

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check