Routing security
AS42309 STINGNET
Unclassified RIPE
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS42309 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 77.240.208.0/20 | RPKI valid | IRR | 54 |
| 77.240.222.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 54 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS42309 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 77.240.208.0/20 | /24 | RIPENCC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS8473 | Bahnhof AB | Declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS42309 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 77.240.208.0/20 | RIPE | STINGNET | BAHNHOF-NCC | 2011-05-27 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS42309 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-BAHNHOF | RIPE | Lists AS42309 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-27 12:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-27. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.