asn.dev

Routing security

AS41019 BURGASNET

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 2 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 1 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS41019 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.84.184.0/22RPKI validIRR53
45.84.184.0/23RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

1 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS41019 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.84.184.0/22/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS41019 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.84.184.0/24RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Not announced
45.84.185.0/24RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Not announced
45.84.186.0/23RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Not announced
45.84.186.0/24RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Not announced
45.84.187.0/24RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Not announced
2a02:2248:1::/48RIPE—LIR-GCN-MNT2024-11-19Not announced
2a02:2248:2::/56RIPEBURGASNET-v6LIR-GCN-MNT2024-11-19Not announced
2a0e:9e80::/29RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12019-06-08Not announced
45.84.184.0/22RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12019-05-31Announced
45.84.184.0/23RIPE—MNT-BG-BURGASNET-12021-03-20Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS41019 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BALKANIXRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-BSNETRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-BTC-UPRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-CETINBG-OUTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-GCN-OUTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-GCN-THRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-NETERRA-INTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-NETIXRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-NETIX-INTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-NETIX-NETRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-TELENORBGRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-VARNAIXRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS-VARTEH-INTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS34224:AS-NETERRA-INTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS57463:AS-NETIX-INTRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member
AS57463:AS-NETIX-NETRIPELists AS41019 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.