asn.dev

Routing security

AS400684 ZOOMFIBER-01

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 31% 4 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 9 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 92% 1 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS400684 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
38.100.184.0/21No ROANo IRR51
38.100.184.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.185.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.186.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.187.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.188.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.189.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.190.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
38.100.191.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
208.75.96.0/21RPKI validIRR57
208.75.96.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57
208.75.97.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
208.75.100.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS400684 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
23.130.244.0/24/24ARIN
208.75.96.0/21/24ARIN
2605:5ec0::/32/48ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS174Cogent Communications, LLCDeclaredObserved
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclarednot observed
AS11597Mercury BroadbandDeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS400684 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
23.130.244.0/24ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-15Not announced
38.100.184.0/22ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-04Not announced
38.100.188.0/23ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-04Not announced
38.100.190.0/23ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-04Not announced
2605:5ec0::/32ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-15Not announced
208.75.96.0/21ARINP.O. Box 305MNT-ZFL-72026-05-15Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS400684 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AS11597-MWARINLists AS400684 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS400684 as a direct member
AS40407:AS-PEERSARINLists AS400684 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-26 12:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-26. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.