asn.dev

Routing security

AS39806 ADMAX

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 20% 4 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 16 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 95% 1 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS39806 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
185.88.136.0/22No ROANo IRR50
2a0f:c140::/29No ROAIRR29
2a04:780::/29No ROAIRR30
178.21.72.0/21No ROAIRR52
178.21.72.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
178.21.73.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
178.21.74.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
178.21.75.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
178.21.79.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
185.88.137.0/24No ROAIRR50
194.32.151.0/24No ROAIRR50
194.68.189.0/24No ROAIRR50
195.190.149.0/24No ROAIRR50
195.190.150.0/24No ROAIRR50
195.190.154.0/24No ROAIRR50
195.190.157.0/24No ROAIRR50
2a0b:2200::/29RPKI validIRR29
185.166.232.0/23RPKI validIRR covering50
185.166.232.0/24RPKI validIRR50
185.166.233.0/24RPKI validIRR covering50

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS39806 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.166.232.0/23/24RIPENCC
185.166.234.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.166.235.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0b:2200::/29/64RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS39806 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.88.136.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-05-26Not announced
185.88.138.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-05-26Not announced
185.88.139.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-05-26Not announced
185.166.232.0/22RIPE—ADMAX-MNT2016-09-17Not announced
178.21.72.0/21RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-08-25Announced
185.88.137.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-05-26Announced
185.166.232.0/24RIPE—WIRELINE-MNT2023-04-12Announced
194.32.151.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-08-25Announced
194.68.189.0/24RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-06-08Announced
195.190.149.0/24RIPE—SECURESPACE-MNT2026-06-23Announced
195.190.150.0/24RIPE—SECURESPACE-MNT2026-06-23Announced
195.190.154.0/24RIPE—SECURESPACE-MNT2026-06-23Announced
195.190.157.0/24RIPE—SECURESPACE-MNT2026-06-23Announced
2a04:780::/29RIPEADMAXADMAX-MNT2015-08-04Announced
2a0b:2200::/29RIPE—ADMAX-MNT2019-11-12Announced
2a0f:c140::/29RIPE—SECURESPACE-MNT2026-06-23Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS39806 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ADMAXRIPELists AS39806 as a direct member
AS29518:AS-BREDBAND2RIPELists AS39806 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.