asn.dev

Routing security

AS395768 ITERATEL-1123 - iTeraTEL Communications Inc.

Hosting RIPE Content

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 25 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 25 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

25 observed

Every prefix observed with AS395768 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.42.192.0/22No ROAIRR51
142.202.148.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.148.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.149.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.150.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.150.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.151.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.160.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.160.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.161.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.162.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.162.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
142.202.163.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
146.71.90.0/23No ROAIRR51
146.71.90.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
146.71.91.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
146.71.92.0/23No ROAIRR51
146.71.92.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
146.71.93.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
204.10.164.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
204.10.165.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
204.10.166.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
204.10.167.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
2605:8b40::/33No ROAIRR covering18
2605:8b40:8000::/33No ROAIRR covering18

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS395768 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS395768 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
142.202.148.0/22ARINiTeraTEL Communications Inc.MNT-IC-11232020-01-21Not announced
142.202.160.0/22ARINCanadaHost Inc.MNT-CANAD-1042020-04-09Not announced
204.10.164.0/22ARINiTeraWeb Solutions Inc.MNT-IS-8832020-04-09Not announced
2605:8b40::/32ARINiTeraTEL Communications Inc.MNT-IC-11232020-04-09Not announced
45.42.192.0/22ARINiTeraTEL Communications Inc.MNT-IC-11232021-01-07Announced
146.71.90.0/23ARINiTeraTEL Communications Inc.MNT-IC-11232020-01-22Announced
146.71.92.0/23ARINiTeraTEL Communications Inc.MNT-IC-11232020-01-22Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS395768 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ITERATELPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-TORIXARINLists AS395768 as a direct member
AS30176:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS395768 as a direct member
AS53999:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS395768 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-04 19:18 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-04. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.