Autonomous system
AS39308 ASK-AS ANDISHE SABZ KHAZAR CO. P.J.S.
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Andishe Sabz Khazar
isp iran residential
ASK-AS is operated by Andishe Sabz Khazar Co. P.J.S., an Iranian internet service provider.
What it's used for
- The address space is registered under netnames such as
IR-ASK-20060127,IR-ASK-20091103, andASK-ZONES, all attributed to Andishe Sabz Khazar Co. P.J.S. - The AS announces 29,952 IPv4 addresses across 17 prefixes while maintaining only 1 observed routing neighbour, a ratio characteristic of an access network rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber eyeballs for residential and business users in Iran, as indicated by the operator's classification as an ISP.
Notable
- All registrants in the evidence pack align with the announcer, consistently listing Andishe Sabz Khazar Co. P.J.S.
- The inventory is dominated by the 89.144.0.0/16 range, with additional blocks in 109.109.0.0/16, 159.20.0.0/16, and 185.56.0.0/16.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS43754 | Asiatech Data Transmission company | 817 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 17 prefixes · 29.95K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 17 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS39308- Registry name
- ASK-AS
- Registrant
- MNT-ASK1
- Abuse contact
- abuse@askiran.com
- Registered
- 2006-01-27
- Last changed
- 2024-05-26
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 13 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 8 authorising AS39308
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 92% registered · 12 of 13 announcements
- Route objects
- 36 naming AS39308
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 451 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere