asn.dev

Routing security

AS39237 ITS-AS ISP-in-kosova

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS39237 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
194.169.164.0/24No ROAIRR53
194.169.165.0/24No ROAIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS39237 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS39237 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
194.169.164.0/24RIPEITS PrishtineMNT-ITS-KS2018-09-27Announced
194.169.165.0/24RIPEITS ClientsMNT-ITS-KS2018-09-27Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS39237 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-KUJTESA-SETRIPELists AS39237 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS39237 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.