Autonomous system
AS38965 HOSTIN
Hosting RIPE Content
Summary
HostIn
hosting netherlands small
HOSTIN is operated by HostIn, a Dutch web hosting provider.
What it's used for
- The address space carries hosting infrastructure, evidenced by netnames
NL-HOSTIN-20201228andNL-HOSTINand registrant data for "Rick van der Sterren trading as HostIn". - The AS announces 512 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and 2 IPv6 prefixes, while maintaining 101 observed neighbours. This high neighbour-to-address ratio indicates a transit-heavy role, typical for a hosting provider peering extensively to deliver content and services.
- Traffic from this AS consists of web hosting services, including shared hosting, dedicated servers, and related web infrastructure endpoints.
Notable
- Registrants for both announced IPv4 prefixes align with the AS holder, listing "HostIn" and "Rick van der Sterren trading as HostIn".
- The address inventory is compact, consisting of two /24 IPv4 blocks and two IPv6 prefixes, consistent with a specialized hosting operation rather than a large-scale ISP.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 4 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| AMS-IX Amsterdam | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 80.249.212.1 |
| The Frys Internet Exchange | Frysian, Netherlands | 2001:7f8:10f::9835:39 |
| Speed Internet Exchange | Dronten, Netherlands | 185.1.222.113 |
| LayerSwitch Internet Exchange | The Hague, Netherlands | 185.1.32.39 |
Transit providers
21 upstream, 0 downstream and 29 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| NL | Netherlands | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS38965- Registry name
- HOSTIN
- Registrant
- HOSTIN-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hostin.cc
- Registered
- 2018-11-02
- Last changed
- 2026-05-28
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- HostIn
- Network type
- Content
- Scope
- Europe
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Outbound
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS-HOSTIN- Present at
- 4 exchanges
- Facilities
- 6 facilities
- Website
- https://www.hostin.cc
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 5 authorising AS38965
- ASPA
- 4 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS38965
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere