Autonomous system
AS38705 DACOM-AS-KR-KR - KOREA DATA
Hosting APNIC
Summary
Korea Data
business korea data
The AS handle DACOM-AS-KR is held by Korea Data.
What it's used for
- The address space carries business and data infrastructure traffic, as indicated by the consistent
KDATA-KRnetname across all registered prefixes. - The network announces 28,672 IPv4 addresses across 32 prefixes with only 1 observed neighbour, a ratio that implies a dedicated access or internal corporate estate rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of web and API endpoints, office workers, and data center services associated with Korea Data's operations in South Korea.
Notable
- All registrants align with the announcer, with every prefix registered under
IRT-KRNIC-KRand netnamedKDATA-KR. - The address inventory is finely subdivided into numerous /24 and /23 blocks, reflecting a segmented internal corporate estate rather than a broad residential allocation.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS4766 | Korea Telecom | 1,586 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-02, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 28 prefixes · 27.39K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 28 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS38705- Registry name
- DACOM-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2007-08-24
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 28 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS38705
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 10% registered · 3 of 30 announcements 16 other origin
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS38705
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-03. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere