asn.dev

Routing security

AS38439 ZL-102-38439

Unclassified ARIN Enterprise

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS38439 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
199.127.129.0/24RPKI validIRR58
2001:470:40a::/48RPKI validIRR34
2001:470:d0::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f831::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f831:d0::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2602:f831:d1::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2602:f831:d2::/48RPKI validIRR covering34
2602:f831:d3::/48RPKI validIRR covering34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS38439 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
199.127.129.0/24/24ARIN
2001:470:d0::/48/48ARIN
2001:470:40a::/48/48ARIN
2602:f831::/48/48ARIN
2602:f831:d0::/44/48ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS38439 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2602:f831:d0::/44ARINZFS.RENT LLCMNT-ZL-1022025-11-08Not announced
199.127.129.0/24ARINZFS.RENT LLCMNT-ZL-1022025-11-08Announced
2001:470:d0::/48ARINHurricane Electric LLCMNT-HURC2025-10-11Announced
2001:470:40a::/48ARINHurricane Electric LLCMNT-HURC2025-10-11Announced
2602:f831::/48ARINZFS.RENT - CUSTOMER IPV6MNT-ZL-1022025-10-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS38439 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ZFSRENTPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-CLOUDIE:AS-FREMONTARINLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS-CLOUDIE:AS-FREMONTRIPELists AS38439 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS-SFMIX-RSARINLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS20446:AS-PEERSARINLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS38439:AS-CONEARINLists AS38439 as a direct member
AS52025:AS-DOWNSTREAMS-FREMONTRIPELists AS38439 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.