Autonomous system
AS38097 SKB-QRIXNETJJ-AS-KR SK Broadband Co Ltd
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
SK Broadband
residential isp broadband korea
The AS handle SKB-QRIXNETJJ-AS-KR is held by SK Broadband Co Ltd.
What it's used for
- The address space carries residential broadband traffic, as indicated by the consistent netname
broadNnet-KRacross all listed prefixes. - The AS announces 51,200 IPv4 addresses across 27 prefixes and maintains a single observed neighbour, a ratio characteristic of an access network rather than a transit provider.
- Traffic from this AS consists of subscriber eyeballs for SK Broadband's cable and fiber internet services in South Korea.
Notable
- All registrants for the largest prefixes are
IRT-KRNIC-KR, which aligns with the announcer SK Broadband Co Ltd. - The address inventory is heavily subdivided, with numerous /22, /23, and /24 blocks within the 61.102.0.0/16 range, reflecting granular allocation for different service regions or customer segments.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9318 | SK Broadband Co Ltd | 1,647 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 27 prefixes · 51.20K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 27 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS38097- Registry name
- SKB-QRIXNETJJ-AS-KR-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 2006-07-07
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 27 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS38097
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 96% registered · 26 of 27 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 435 naming AS38097
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere