Autonomous system
AS37594 MTN
Unclassified AFRINIC
Summary
MTN South Sudan
mobile telecom ss
The AS handle MTN is held by MTN South Sudan.
What it's used for
- The address space is registered under the netname
ORG-MSS2-AFRINICfor MTN South Sudan, a subsidiary of the MTN Group operating mobile and broadband services in South Sudan. - The AS announces 2048 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and maintains 1 observed neighbour, a ratio consistent with a mobile access network providing local connectivity rather than transit.
Notable
- Both announced prefixes, 102.64.72.0/22 and 197.231.236.0/22, list MTN South Sudan as the registrant, aligning the registry data with the AS announcer.
- MTN South Sudan was established in 2011 following the independence of South Sudan and operates as part of the multinational MTN Group.
- The inventory consists of two /22 blocks with no IPv6 prefixes announced.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS16637 | MTN SA | 586 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SS | South Sudan | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- AFRINIC
- Registered
- 2013-04-26
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- MTN South Sudan
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 10 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 10 authorising AS37594
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS37594
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere