asn.dev

Routing security

AS37087 STLGHANA

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS37087 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
41.191.96.0/22RPKI validIRR55
41.191.96.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
41.191.97.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
41.191.98.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
41.191.99.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
196.50.28.0/22RPKI validIRR51
196.50.28.0/24RPKI validIRR56
196.50.29.0/24RPKI validIRR56
196.50.30.0/24RPKI validIRR53
196.50.31.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS37087 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
41.191.96.0/22/22AFRINIC
41.191.96.0/24/24AFRINIC
41.191.97.0/24/24AFRINIC
41.191.98.0/24/24AFRINIC
41.191.99.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.50.28.0/22/22AFRINIC
196.50.28.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.50.29.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.50.30.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.50.31.0/24/24AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS37087 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
41.191.96.0/22RADBSuper Tech STL LimitedMAINT-AS3278142023-11-13Announced
196.50.28.0/22RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS369942023-11-13Announced
196.50.28.0/24AFRINICSTL BlockSUPERTECH-MNT2017-03-10Announced
196.50.28.0/24RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS369942023-11-13Announced
196.50.29.0/24AFRINICSTL BlockSUPERTECH-MNT2017-03-10Announced
196.50.30.0/24AFRINICSTL BlockSUPERTECH-MNT2017-03-10Announced
196.50.31.0/24AFRINICSTL BlockSUPERTECH-MNT2017-03-10Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS37087 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-37087-STLAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-37662AFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-DOLPHIN-TRANSITRADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-ECOBANDAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-ECOBANDRADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-GIXAAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-MAINONEAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-MAINONERADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-SET-AFRIXRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-SET-ECOBANDAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-SKYVISIONRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-VB-TRANSITAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-VB-TRANSITRADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-VF-GHAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-VF-GHRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-VODACOM-NIGERIA-ASESAFRINICLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS-WIOCCRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS12491:AS-GILAT-TELECOMRADBLists AS37087 as a direct member
AS12491:AS-IPPLANETRIPELists AS37087 as a direct member
AS37087:AS-CONERADBLists AS37087 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.