asn.dev

Routing security

AS36865 MZ-TELEDATA

Unclassified APNIC Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 28 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 28 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 28 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

28 observed

Every prefix observed with AS36865 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
41.221.64.0/20No ROANo IRR55
41.221.64.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.69.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.70.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.71.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.72.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.73.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.75.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.76.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.77.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.78.0/24No ROANo IRR55
41.221.79.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.48.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.49.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.50.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.51.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.52.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.53.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.54.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.55.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.56.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.57.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.58.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.59.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.60.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.61.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.62.0/24No ROANo IRR55
196.22.63.0/24No ROANo IRR55

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS36865 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS36865 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS36865 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-37662AFRINICLists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-CPRMRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-DIVIVOXRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-EUTELSAT-TH2RIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-INTELSATUSRADBLists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-SET-SEACOMRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-TDM_NEWRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member
AS-WIOCCRIPELists AS36865 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.