asn.dev

Routing security

AS3657 TSS-NET

Residential ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 17 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS3657 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
66.7.96.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.97.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.98.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.99.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.100.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.101.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.102.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.103.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.104.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.105.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.106.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.107.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.108.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.109.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.110.0/24RPKI validIRR51
66.7.111.0/24RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

17 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS3657 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
66.7.96.0/20/20ARIN
66.7.96.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.97.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.98.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.99.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.100.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.101.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.102.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.103.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.104.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.105.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.106.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.107.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.108.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.109.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.110.0/24/24ARIN
66.7.111.0/24/24ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

18 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS3657 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
66.7.96.0/20ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Not announced
66.7.96.0/20RADBSpectrum Networks Proxy RegistrationMAINT-AS114042023-11-13Not announced
66.7.96.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.97.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.98.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.99.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.100.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.101.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.102.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.103.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.104.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.105.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.106.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.107.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.108.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.109.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.110.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced
66.7.111.0/24ARINPO Box 69MNT-TDS-2052024-09-03Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS3657 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-TSSDIGITALARINLists AS3657 as a direct member
AS-WAVE-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS3657 as a direct member
AS-WHOLESAILARINLists AS3657 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.